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INTRODUCTION 
In 1959, Ronald Coase published his landmark paper on the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) that would forever change 
the study of property rights.1  The primary focus of Coase’s article was 
to critique the FCC’s then-current approach to allocating spectrum, in 
which the FCC designated frequencies exclusively for particular uses 
(e.g., AM radio, television broadcasting, radio astronomy), divided 
those bands into individual licenses, and then conducted hearings to 
determine to whom the Commission should assign operating licenses 
created within those bands.  These restrictions were thought necessary 
to prevent the chaos that occurs when multiple people attempt to use 
the same frequency simultaneously as well as to limit the interference 
that particular uses impose on adjacent frequencies.2 
Coase offered two trenchant criticisms of the prevailing regime.  
First, he argued that the public would be better served if the FCC 
stopped relying on administrative processes to allocate spectrum and 
instead relied on auctions to determine who should receive licenses.3  
Second, he asserted that the government need not predetermine spec-
trum uses in order to prevent interference.  The government needed 
only provide a clear definition of the rights encompassed within each 
license and to permit the license holders to reallocate interference 
rights as they saw fit.4  Although Coase recognized that spectrum usage 
exhibited unusual interdependencies, he expressed confidence that 
 
1 R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959). 
2 See id. at 12-13, 25-26 (summarizing the rationale for the FCC’s policy). 
3 Id. at 14, 17-19. 
4 Id. at 25-27, 30. 
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the parties could address such complexities through artful structuring 
of transactions and general legal principles.5 
Coase’s article on the FCC soon took on “iconic significance for 
law and economics scholars.”6  When pressed to expand on his vision 
of how market transactions could address externalities without direct 
regulation, Coase responded with The Problem of Social Cost,7 which laid 
out what would become known as the Coase Theorem.8  This work is 
often described as the most-cited article of all time in both law and 
economics,9 served as one of the justifications for awarding Coase the 
Nobel Prize, and has become “the starting point of most modern dis-
cussions of the economics of property rights.”10   
Coase’s impact on spectrum policy was equally dramatic.  The FCC 
conducted its first spectrum auction in 1994,11 and, with only a few des-
ignated exceptions, current law now requires that the FCC allocate all 
future licenses via auction.12  But the FCC has yet to fully embrace the 
second half of Coase’s vision, which calls for replacing use restrictions 
with property rights.  The FCC has taken limited steps toward allowing 
licensees to include secondary uses of spectrum so long as they do not 
interfere with the designated primary use,13 despite criticisms that it 
 
5 Id. at 29-30. 
6 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and  
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 371 (2001). 
7 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 n.1 (1960) 
(“[C]omments which I have received seemed to suggest that it would be desirable to 
deal with the question in a more explicit way and without reference to the [FCC’s regu-
lation of spectrum].”). 
8 See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 (3d ed. 1966). 
9 See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 751, 759 (1996) (verifying that The Problem of Social Cost is the most-cited article in 
law, amassing almost two times the number of citations as any other law-related article, 
and noting that it is often said to be the most-cited article in economics). 
10 Merrill & Smith, supra note 6, at 366. 
11 See About Auctions, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/ 
default.htm?job=about_auctions (last updated Aug. 9, 2006) (chronicling the FCC’s 
transition to a spectrum auction policy). 
12 47 U.S.C. § 309( j)(1) (2006).  The designated exceptions are for key public  
safety radio services, noncommercial educational broadcast stations, and the initial 
digital television licenses allocated in 1997 to replace analog television licenses.  Id. 
§ 309( j)(2). 
13 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.9001–.9080 (2011) (allowing and providing guidelines for spec-
trum leasing); id. §§ 15.701–.717 (authorizing unlicensed wireless service in the televi-
sion bands); id. § 73.295(a) (authorizing FM broadcasters to use subcarrier frequencies 
to provide subsidiary services such as paging); id. § 73.624(c) (authorizing digital televi-
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would do better to permit flexibility in primary uses instead.14  The 
agency also followed the 2002 recommendation of the Spectrum Poli-
cy Task Force15 to seek comment on a proposal to replace use re-
strictions with a concept it called the “interference temperature”16 
before abandoning the idea as unworkable in 2007.17  The FCC’s  
National Broadband Plan does not mention the need for a compre-
hensive metric for interference, opting instead for tweaks to the exist-
ing regime of use restrictions.18  Restricting licenses to predetermined 
uses essentially requires the FCC to rezone spectrum and relocate the 
incumbents before any new uses for spectrum can emerge.  I believe 
that the incomplete reception of Coase’s ideas provides some funda-
mental insights into new forms of property arising in an increasingly 
high-tech world.  In particular, this incomplete reception suggests that 
the complex interdependencies that Coase downplayed may play a 
more important role than he initially thought.   
This Article explores these key differences and their implications 
for property theory.  Part I identifies the interdependencies that char-
acterize modern forms of property.  It begins by examining the key 
technical characteristics of spectrum before examining the interde-
 
sion broadcasters to offer telecommunications services on an ancillary or supplemen-
tary basis). 
14 See Comments of 37 Concerned Economists at 5-6, Promoting Efficient Use of 
Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets, 
68 Fed. Reg. 66,252 (2003) (to be codified at scattered sections of 47 C.F.R.) (FCC 00-
402), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=6512460886 (urging the 
FCC to “broaden the rights generally granted licensees, permitting flexible use of the allo-
cated spectrum”). 
15 See FCC, ET DOCKET NO. 02-135, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT 27-30 
(2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A1 
.pdf (outlining the Task Force’s recommendations regarding “interference temperature”). 
16 Compare Interference Temperature Operation, 69 Fed. Reg. 2863 (proposed Jan. 
21, 2004) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 15) (proposing an interference temperature 
limit and procedure), with Establishment of an Interference Temperature Metric to 
Quantify and Manage Interference and to Expand Available Unlicensed Operation in 
Certain Fixed, Mobile and Satellite Frequency Bands, Notice of Inquiry and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 25,309 (2003), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/ 
Document_Indexes/Engineering_Technology/2003_index_OET_Notice.html (propos-
ing the interference temperature model). 
17 See Interference Temperature Operation, 72 Fed. Reg. 29,929 (May 30, 2007) (to 
be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 15). 
18 See FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA:  THE NATIONAL BROAD-BAND PLAN 83, 93 (2010), 
available at http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf (pro-
posing minor changes to the current regulatory scheme for secondary markets and 
spectrum sharing). 
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pendencies in two other emergent technologies:  the Internet and the 
distribution grid for electric power.  Part II discusses the key policy 
implications of those interdependencies, specifically the need to devel-
op tools to identify sources of congestion and to allocate harm among 
them, and it rejects some of the bases developed under the common 
law to deal with the problems of multiple causation.  Part III examines 
the policy implications for the various forms of property.  It begins 
with the now-traditional debate between property rights and com-
mons, taking each in turn.  It also considers the possibility of having a 
market maker span different individual properties.  Part IV examines 
the academic literature to identify justifications for the persistence of 
use restrictions in light of these interdependencies. 
I.  EXAMPLES OF NEW PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Coase recognized that spectrum involved “interconnections  
between the ways in which frequencies are used” that could “raise spe-
cial problems not found elsewhere or, at least, not to the same de-
gree,” such as the fact that certain sources of radio emissions could 
cause interference across multiple frequencies and over long distanc-
es.19  Coase also acknowledged that “[i]t may be costly to discover who 
it is that is causing the trouble.”20  He nonetheless downplayed the sig-
nificance of this point, averring that market transactions augmented 
by traditional notions of tort and property law would suffice to allocate 
spectrum efficiently.21  That said, he conceded that the issue was ulti-
mately an empirical question that “only experience could show.”22  
The failure of true spectrum property rights to emerge suggests 
that the aspects that Coase downplayed in his analysis may be more 
important than he believed.  The first Section of this Part analyzes the 
interdependencies that characterize spectrum usage.  The following 
two Sections explore similar problems arising with respect to the  
Internet and the electric power grid.  This analysis makes clear that 
modern forms of technology create interdependencies that are more 
complex than previous forms of property.  In particular, sources of 
interference are more cumulative, more unpredictable, more geo-
 
19 Coase, supra note 1, at 30. 
20 Id. at 29. 
21 Id. at 29-30. 
22 Id. at 30. 
Yoo Revised Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)5/30/2012 7:58 PM 
2194 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 2189 
 
graphically discontinuous, and more variable than is typically the case 
with real property.  Moreover, the information needed to address these 
problems tends to be decentralized and only locally available, which 
both inhibits any entity from possessing the information necessary to 
optimize usage and makes enforcement difficult. 
A.  Spectrum 
Spectrum is unusual in that a wide variety of factors affects its 
available capacity.  Its efficiency varies with the time of day, the season 
of the year, and the weather.23  Moreover, different frequencies vary in 
their ability to penetrate buildings and foliage, diffract through obsta-
cles, and refract over the horizon.  In addition, every wire and device 
that involves electric current generates some degree of interference.  
All of these factors are environmental qualities rather than property 
rights that need to be defined legally.  They tend to operate within the 
same band of frequencies as the original transmission.  They are also 
stable relative to the period of time of particular transmissions.  Other 
limitations are the result of the physics of wave propagation.  These 
give rise to interference that changes rapidly over time and across 
small changes in location in ways that can be difficult to predict. 
1.  Shannon’s Law and the Cumulative Nature of Interference 
One of the most fundamental, yet frequently overlooked, princi-
ples of wave-based communications is Shannon’s Law.  Shannon’s Law 
holds that the maximum error-free capacity of any bandwidth-limited 
channel depends on the signal-to-noise ratio. 24  The louder the back-
ground noise, or the weaker the primary signal, the lower the total  
capacity.25 
Although the formal proof of this principle is somewhat complex, 
the intuitions underlying this insight are relatively simple.  Consider a 
conversation at a cocktail party.  As the background noise increases, 
guests have to speak more slowly and loudly in order to be intelligible, 
 
23 Arthur S. De Vany et al., A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic 
Spectrum:  A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1499, 1519 (1969). 
24 See Claude E. Shannon, Communication in the Presence of Noise, 37 PROC. INST.  
RADIO ENG’RS 10, 16-18 (1949) (proving the effect of background noise on signal 
strength). 
25 Id. 
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thereby lowering the effective throughput rate for communication.  One 
guest’s increase in speaking volume is perceived by all of the other 
guests as noise, who then must respond by increasing their volume and 
slowing their communication rate.  Once the total number of speakers 
passes a certain threshold, any further communication becomes com-
pletely impossible.   
For our purposes, the fact that capacity is a function of signal-to-
noise ratio makes different people’s use of the spectrum highly inter-
dependent.  Because each person’s signal is perceived as noise by  
everyone else, every person’s attempt to communicate necessarily re-
duces the capacity available to others transmitting in the same area.  
Indeed, as the density of people using a wireless network increases, the 
capacity of that network converges to zero.26  Moreover, because low-
power uses generate relatively weak signals, they are more susceptible 
to interference.27   
2.  Geographic Discontinuities 
The fact that signals attenuate as they propagate outwards allows 
more than one person to use the same spectrum if they are sufficiently 
dispersed geographically.  The physics of wave propagation inevitably 
gives rise to certain imperfections.  For example, the fact that the 
strength of a wave attenuates as it travels through space does not mean 
its strength drops to zero when it reaches its contour boundary.28  More-
over, because electromagnetic waves naturally propagate outward in a 
circle, some degree of geographic overlap is inevitable.  Those allocat-
ing spectrum must either permit gaps in coverage or tolerate some 
degree of overlap (and thus interference).29  The use of smaller or var-
iably sized circles can ameliorate the problem, but not solve it com-
pletely.  Directional antennas can alter the contour so that it is no 
longer circular.  This is done to prevent broadcasters from intruding 
 
26 See Piyush Gupta & P.R. Kumar, The Capacity of Wireless Networks, 46 IEEE TRANS-
ACTIONS ON INFO. THEORY 388, 391 (2000) (noting the decrease in throughput when 
the number of nodes is large). 
27 See Phillip J. Weiser & Dale Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next Frontier of 
Property Rights, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 549, 572 (2008) (explaining how low-power use 
can lead to “spillover problems”). 
28 See id. at 569-70 (“[R]adio waves emanate from a transmitter and, while they  
get steadily weaker with distance, they do not respect or automatically stop at preset 
borders.”). 
29 See infra Figure 1. 
Yoo Revised Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)5/30/2012 7:58 PM 
2196 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 2189 
 
into foreign territory or into other stations’ service contours.30  Yet 
such a solution only works for stationary transmission sources and is 
thus ill suited to the mobile wireless communications that dominate 
the current industry.  That said, these geographic spillovers necessarily 
involve transmissions from adjacent areas that are relatively easy to 
identify and remediate. 
 
Figure 1:  The Inherent Geographic Imperfections in Coverage31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interference can also arise from sources that are geographically 
distant.  One source of interference known as “skip” occurs when radio 
signals bounce off the ionosphere after it descends at night.32  As any-
one who has unexpectedly picked up a distant AM radio station at 
night knows, skip can allow signals to cause interference hundreds of 
miles away.33 
A more interesting and complex phenomenon is known as “multi-
path propagation,” where the same signal arrives at the same point via 
 
30 See Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission’s Rules to Permit Short-Spaced FM 
Station Assignments by Using Directional Antennas, Notice of Inquiry, 2 FCC Rcd. 3141 
(1987) (noting that directional antennas can permit the more efficient use of space by 
reducing required separation distances).  
31 If the hexagons in each image represent contour boundaries, the white areas in 
the center hexagon on the left represent coverage gaps, while the areas in which the 
center circle on the right overlaps onto the adjacent hexagons represent interference. 
32 See ANDREW S. TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS 79 fig.2-12, 103 (4th ed. 2003) 
(depicting how the ionosphere, “a layer of charged particles circling the earth at a 
height of 100 to 500 km,” reflects certain radio waves). 
33 See Richard W. Stevens, Anarchy in the Skip Zone:  A Proposal for Market Allocation of 
High Frequency Spectrum, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 44 n.4 (1988) (noting that the reflection 
of radio waves off of the ionosphere and back to earth allows radio signals to travel long 
distances); see also id. at 46 fig.1 (depicting the skip phenomenon). 
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multiple routes, with one signal arriving directly and one or more  
other signals reflecting off some adjacent surface.34  At a minimum, 
unless the receiver is able to distinguish between these signals, it will 
perceive the reflected signal as capacity-reducing noise.35  Moreover, 
should the peaks from the direct signal arrive at the same time as the 
peaks of the reflected signal, the waves can reinforce each other, 
thereby creating a localized hot spot in which the signal is unusually 
strong.36  We see such phenomena in whispering galleries, where the 
particular shape of the room allows sound to travel across a room even 
though a person speaks at a very low volume.   
 
Figure 2:  Reinforcement of Two Wave Forms that 
Are Perfectly in Phase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conversely, should the peaks from the direct signal arrive at the 
same time as the valleys of the reflected signal, the waves can cancel 
each other out, as occurs with noise-dampening systems in head-
phones and cars.  Christian Sandvig related a particularly vivid exam-
ple of this.  While living in London, he used an antenna to provide 
WiFi access to the famous Speakers’ Corner in Hyde Park only to find 
that the signal intermittently failed.37  He eventually discovered that the 
interference arose whenever a double-decker bus was forced to stop at a 
 
34 See, e.g., De Vany et al., supra note 23, at 1519-20 & 1520 fig.3 (describing and 
depicting multipath propagation). 
35 See id. at 1520 (noting that multipath propagation resulting from two signals can 
have negative consequences, even where neither signal is harmful). 
36 See infra Figure 2. 
37 I previously recounted this story in Christopher S. Yoo, “Rough Consensus and 
Running Code”:  Integrating Engineering Principles into the Internet Policy Debates, 63 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 341, 356 (2011). 
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nearby traffic light.38  Even though the bus did not directly obstruct the 
waves travelling to and from the Speakers’ Corner, it created a multi-
path reflection that periodically cancelled out the direct signal.39 
 
Figure 3:  Cancellation by Two Wave Forms that  
Are 180º Out of Phase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When multipath propagation occurs, small changes in location 
can cause signal strength to vary widely.  In addition, the precise effect 
can vary with the position of mobile objects, such as cars and trucks.  
The result is that the amount of interference can change dynamically 
and unpredictably minute-to-minute as a person walks across a room 
or if that person stays in the same location.  Both the latest generation 
WiFi standard and the 4G standard known as LTE are able to use mul-
tiple antennas and sophisticated processing to distinguish between 
different multipathed signals through a technique known as “multiple 
input/multiple output” (MIMO).40  However, these solutions do not 
prevent these multipathed signals from being perceived as interfer-
ence by others. 
3.  Interference from Transmission on Other Frequencies 
Geographic separation is not the only technique for allowing mul-
tiple parties to use the spectrum simultaneously.  The FCC also divides 
the spectrum into different frequencies and assigns them to different 
 
38 Id. 
39 Id.; see also infra Figure 3.  For a description of the project, see PHILIP N. HOWARD, 
NEW MEDIA CAMPAIGNS AND THE MANAGED CITIZEN, at xi-xii (2006). 
40 See Kevin Werbach, Supercommons:  Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless Communication, 
82 TEX. L. REV. 863, 897 (2004) (describing “MIMO chipsets . . . that extend the range 
end capacity of WiFi systems”). 
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licensees.41  So long as the receivers are able to distinguish among 
transmissions on different frequencies, multiple users can transmit on 
different frequencies without interfering with one another even if they 
are operating in the same geographic area. 
Frequency division multiplexing would work well if licensees could 
limit their transmissions to their assigned frequencies.42  The problem is 
that every transmission inevitably spills over onto adjacent frequencies, 
with the degree of interference tapering as the distance from the base 
frequency increases.43  Every transmission also generates harmonic emis-
sions that are integer fractions of the frequency of the original trans-
mission.44  Transmissions can also create an unusual form of harmonic 
resonance known as “intermodulation,” which occurs when two signals 
combine to cause a third transmitter to radiate on a different frequen-
cy.45  Even though each of the original two signals does not cause any 
interference, the interaction between the two creates interference. 
*      *      * 
In short, the physics of wave propagation can cause interference to 
be quite variable and to arise in locations that are quite distant from 
the original transmission in terms of both geography and frequency.  
As a result, interference can be difficult to trace.  The fact that inter-
ference is cumulative and is sometimes produced by the interaction 
among multiple sources that are not themselves problematic creates 
the need for some basis for apportioning harm across multiple causal 
 
41 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
42 See TANENBAUM, supra note 32, at 104 (noting that frequency division multiplex-
ing is characterized by “overlap between adjacent channels because the fillers do not 
have sharp edges”). 
43 See Szu-wei Wang & Stephen S. Rappaport, Balanced Channel Assignment Patterns 
for Cellular Communications Systems, in 1 DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY . . . SPANNING THE UNI-
VERSE:  IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS 452, 453 (1988). 
44 See HARVEY J. LEVIN, THE INVISIBLE RESOURCE:  USE AND REGULATION OF THE  
RADIO SPECTRUM 91 (1971) (alluding to “the problem of spurious emissions . . . of 
harmonic . . . channel interference”); Jora R. Minasian, Property Rights in Radiation:  An 
Alternative Approach to Radio Frequency Allocation, 18 J.L. & ECON. 221, 226 (1975) (“The 
energy radiated on a particular frequency is also repeated with decreasing amplitude 
on frequencies that are a constant multiple of the initial frequency—-‘subharmonic’ to 
it . . . .”). 
45 In particular, intermodulation occurs when the third frequency equals either the 
sum or the difference of the other two frequencies.  De Vany et al., supra note 23, at 
1520-21. 
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factors.  Moreover, because interference arises from the interaction of 
multiple sources at the location of the receiver, transmitters must have 
additional information about the behavior of other transmitters if they 
are to internalize the impact of their actions.   
B.  The Internet 
The Internet is often described as a network of networks, which 
means it is comprised of many independent network providers, with 
the average Internet transaction traversing three to four different net-
works.46  Internet transmissions are also susceptible to interference 
from other transmissions as they compete for finite router and link 
capacity.47  In particular, the Internet is subject to cumulative interfer-
ence and geographic discontinuities quite similar to those arising vis-à-
vis spectrum. 
1.  The Cumulative Nature of Interference 
One of the Internet’s key attributes is that the amount of interfer-
ence caused by one end user’s decision to introduce more traffic into 
the network does not depend solely on the size of that traffic.  It also 
depends on the size of the flows being introduced by other end users.  
Small flows can nonetheless become significant sources of congestion 
if the network is already near saturation.  Conversely, large flows may 
have little to no effect if they are introduced when the network is un-
congested.  In short, interference on the Internet is the cumulative 
product of the bandwidth consumption of all of the end users as well 
as the configuration of the network.   
2.  Geographic Discontinuities 
Interference on the Internet is further complicated by the ability 
of networks to compensate for congestion by rerouting traffic along 
alternate routes.  When rerouting occurs, increases in network activity 
 
46 See Jinjing Zhao et al., Does the Average Path Length Grow in the Internet?, in INFOR-
MATION NETWORKING:  TOWARDS UBIQUITOUS NETWORKING AND SERVICES 183, 184-86 
(Teresa Vazão et al. eds., 2008). 
47 See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 1847, 1862 (2006) (“[R]equests that routers and content servers can fulfill at any 
time [are] . . . constrained.  When data packets arrive at a rate that exceeds the capacity 
of any particular element, they form a queue.”). 
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may create adverse effects in locations quite distant from where the 
network added a new stream to the Internet.48 
 
Figure 4:  Reallocation of Traffic49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consider the impact of an increase in traffic between nodes a and 
b in the simple ring network depicted in Figure 4.  The network will 
respond by rerouting a higher proportion of the traffic between a and 
c onto a-d-c and by reducing the traffic along a-b -c.  This increases the 
traffic along a-d and d-c while reducing the traffic along b -c.  The net-
work will similarly reroute traffic between b and d, shifting more of the 
traffic away from b -a-d toward b -c-d.  Both adjustments will increase the 
traffic on the link between c and d even though that link is completely 
discontinuous with the original increase in traffic between a and b.  In 
short, increases in traffic can create interference in locations that are 
geographically discontinuous from the increase in traffic flow.  Under-
standing the impact of any given increase in traffic requires full 
knowledge of the network’s topology and the other flows currently 
traversing the network.  The distributed nature of the Internet means, 
however, that no single actor has access to all of this information. 
 
48 See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as Com-
plex Systems:  A Graph Theory Approach, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1687, 1710-11 (2005) (explain-
ing the potentially distant effects of a traffic increase along a single link). 
49 Id. at 1710 fig.9. 
d 
b 
c a 
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C.  Electric Power 
Another example of the highly interdependent nature of high-
tech industries is the electric power grid.  Like the Internet, the grid is 
a network that exhibits the same characteristics discussed in the previ-
ous section.  Unlike the Internet, however, electric power is subject to 
a number of fundamental principles that create a much tighter set of 
interdependencies. 
1.  The Cumulative Nature of Interference 
Two principles of physics cause electric power grids to exhibit dis-
tinctive characteristics.  Kirchhoff’s Current Law mandates that the 
sum of all currents flowing into every node must equal to the sum of 
currents flowing out of that node.50  Ohm’s Law holds that when mul-
tiple paths exist connecting two points, power travels along all of those 
paths simultaneously, allocated in inverse proportion to the electrical 
resistance of each path.51  In turn, any change in supply or demand 
inevitably has an immediate impact on all other portions of the grid.  
Unlike the Internet, where an imbalance between demand and supply 
simply leads to delay or a dropped packet, the flows entering and exit-
ing every point of the network must always balance.  The result is 
complex interdependencies that are even more demanding than those 
associated with spectrum.   
2.  Geographic Discontinuities 
The tight interdependencies created by Kirchhoff’s Current Law 
and Ohm’s Law can give rise to an effect known as “loop flow.”   
Because electric power travels along every parallel path connecting 
two points, it cannot be channeled along the most direct path.  In-
stead, some of the power inevitably travels along every path regardless 
of who owns the lines.  In the extreme case, the grid may transfer pow-
er around the grid only to see it consumed where it was initially inject-
ed into the network.52  In addition, changes in demand and supply  
 
50 DAVID K. CHENG, FIELD AND WAVE ELECTROMAGNETICS 209 (1983). 
51 Id. at 203. 
52 Seth Blumsack, Measuring the Benefits and Costs of Regional Electric Grid Integration, 
28 ENERGY L.J. 147, 180 (2007). 
Yoo Revised Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  5/30/2012 7:58 PM 
2012] Beyond Coase 2203 
 
can affect transmission lines located far from the added power flow.53   
These interactions make the impact of added flows difficult to predict.   
Consider the following example, diagrammed in Figure 5.54  Assume 
that nodes 1 and 2 are generating power, and node 3 is consuming 
power.  Assume further that the link between node 1 and node 3 is 
limited to 600 megawatts (MW), while the links connecting nodes 1 
and 2 and nodes 2 and 3 exceed the total demand and thus are for the 
purposes of this example unbounded.  Lastly, assume that the re-
sistance along each link is equal, so that any path that traverses two of 
the links will necessarily have twice the resistance of a path traversing a 
single link. 
 
Figure 5:  Loop Flow55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the total consumption at node 2 is 900 megawatts, then the  
necessary ratio identified by Kirchhoff’s Current Law dictates that the 
only possible solution is for node 1 to provide all of the power, with 
600 MW passing along the link directly connecting nodes 1 and 2 and 
300 MW of the power passing via node 3 (as depicted in the left-hand 
side of Figure 5).  Increases in demand increase the amount of power 
generated at node 3 and reduce the amount of power generated at 
node 1 until demand reaches 1800 MW (as depicted in the right-hand 
side of Figure 5), when node 3 will provide all of the power, with 1200 
 
53 See William W. Hogan, Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission, 4 J. REG. 
ECON. 211, 216 (1992) (“[L]oop flows can affect third parties distant from the intend-
ed power flow . . . .”). 
54 The example is taken from id. at 217. 
55 Id. at 217 fig.2. 
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MW passing directly from node 3 to node 2 and an additional 600 MW 
passing via node 1.  Most notably, the flow of power between nodes 1 
and 3 will reverse. 
Loop flow makes setting prices for the transmission of electric 
power very difficult.  Although compensation is typically based on the 
most direct route, the power actually passes along all of the available 
paths, which means that the amount paid may bear little relationship 
to the cost of the network resources consumed.  Moreover, the fact 
that power flows along all possible paths means that part of the distri-
bution will congest transmission lines owned by companies that are 
not parties to the transaction.56  In addition, the complexity of the  
interactions makes it difficult to attribute such congestion to specific 
transactions.57  The vertical disintegration of generation, transmission, 
and distribution dictates that these costs will not be internalized within 
a single firm.58   
II.  KEY IMPLICATIONS FOR PROPERTY THEORY 
Although spectrum, the Internet, and the electric power grid rep-
resent distinctively different technological phenomena, they share a 
number of important characteristics.  First, the cumulative nature of 
interference creates interdependencies that do not exist with real 
property.  Second, interference can arise in unpredictable locations, 
far from the disturbance that causes it.  Third, the localized nature of 
information makes solving this problem particularly difficult. 
The tightly interdependent and localized nature of new technolo-
gies provides several lessons for property theory.  As an initial matter, 
it suggests that property scholarship should move past the Coasean  
approach that focuses on bargaining-related transaction costs and  
focus instead on technical interdependencies as the key determinant 
of property boundaries.  The cumulative and interdependent nature 
of interference also calls for new approaches both to identifying sources 
of interference and to attributing harm across those various sources. 
 
56 See id. at 216 (noting that, when loop flow causes power to flow down a third party’s 
transmission lines, “third parties may and often do incur costs without compensation”). 
57 Blumsack, supra note 52, at 181. 
58 See Douglas Gegax & Kenneth Nowotny, Competition and the Electric Utility Industry:  
An Evaluation, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 63, 73 (1993) (opining that “in today’s complex sys-
tem of interconnections,” externalities cannot be internalized by a single business ar-
rangement). 
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A.  Interdependencies: The Key Determinant of the  
Boundaries of Property 
The highly interdependent nature of new technologies militates in 
favor of moving away from the bargaining-oriented vision of property 
originated by Coase in favor of a return to a more technology-oriented 
approach.  For example, Carliss Baldwin’s insightful analysis of modu-
larity contends that transactions are not the appropriate primitive unit 
of analysis of the boundaries of a firm.59  Instead, she views interde-
pendencies between the individual tasks required to produce a prod-
uct as the proper primitives.60  Tasks that are highly interdependent 
must be encapsulated within a single functional module.61  Only when 
the interdependencies between tasks are weak can tasks be performed 
by separate firms.62  Although Baldwin’s primary focus was how inter-
dependencies define firm boundaries, her work also has important 
implications for property theory.  As she notes, property rights are 
necessarily suspended within the transaction-free zones within mod-
ules.63  In addition, property rights “allow valuable things . . . to be 
held within the zone, without disruption, for as long as the technology 
demands.”64 
Baldwin’s work suggests a technological vision of property that  
focuses on the interdependencies between tasks rather than the bar-
gaining problems that can prevent the consummation of welfare-
enhancing transactions.  This vision treats transactions as the natural 
byproduct of the more fundamental architecture dictated by the un-
derlying interdependencies. 
 
59 Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do Transactions Come From?  Modularity, Transactions, and 
the Boundaries of Firms, 17 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 155, 156 (2007).  In brief, Baldwin 
look[s] at systems of production as networks, in which tasks-cum-agents are the 
nodes and transfers—of material, energy, and information—between tasks and 
agents are the links.  At this new level of analysis, transactions are not primitive 
units of analysis . . . [but rather are] mutually agreed-upon transfers with com-
pensation . . . located within the task network and serv[ing] to divide one set of 
tasks from another.  
Id. 
60 Id. at 162. 
61 Id. at 157, 180-81. 
62 Id. at 166. 
63 Id. at 182. 
64 Id. at 183. 
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B.  The Complexity of Identifying Sources of Interference 
The interdependencies associated with new technologies can also 
greatly complicate the process of identifying sources of interference.  
Indeed, Coase recognized that “[i]t may be costly to discover who it is 
that is causing the trouble.”65  Although he recognized that the result-
ing market failure may justify some form of regulatory intervention, he 
nonetheless drew a broad analogy to the law of real property and  
expressed confidence that spectrum was not sufficiently distinct to re-
quire a different approach.66  Framing the issues through the lens of real 
property obscured how difficult the task of identifying sources of inter-
ference can be.  In the case of real property, interference came predom-
inantly from adjacent sources (or at least from sources located 
nearby).  This quality made the sources of interference easy to identify 
and required only that each actor have knowledge of local conditions.   
The more interdependent nature of interference associated with 
new technologies makes identifying sources of interference more diffi-
cult.  In addition, the highly localized nature of information makes it 
unlikely that any actor will be able to see all of the information needed 
to appreciate the impact of the interdependencies.  Although it is pos-
sible to characterize these problems in terms of transaction costs, they 
are distinct from the bargaining-related transaction costs that dominate 
the current study of property rights.  They are more technological inter-
actions, more properly addressed in the design of the property itself.   
Any system of property should be configured to provide the in-
formation necessary to support transactions.  Modern property systems 
provide more opportunities than do conventional property systems for 
technological solutions to tracing.  For example, wireless transmissions 
are increasingly based on a technique known as Code Division Multiple 
Access (CDMA) that allows multiple users to use the same spectrum by 
embedding a code to every transmitted signal.  Receivers can be pro-
grammed to recognize the designated code and to disregard signals 
bearing other codes.  CDMA is very efficient—it can increase transmis-
 
65 Coase, supra note 1, at 29. 
66 See id. at 30 (“It is easy to embrace the idea that the interconnections between 
the ways in which frequencies are used raise special problems not found elsewhere or, 
at least, not to the same degree.  But this view is not likely to survive the study of . . . the 
law of property . . . .”). 
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sion capacity over other technologies by a factor of two to ten.67  It also 
offers the basis for identifying the source of a transmission.  Internet 
traffic offers similar opportunities.  The unifying characteristic of the 
Internet is that all traffic is routed based on the Internet Protocol (IP).  
The IP header contains a field listing the source address.  If it were 
made verifiable, it could provide the basis for identifying the source of 
congestion. 
That said, there are limits to how well such a function might work.  
Not every spectrum-based technology uses CDMA, and many interfer-
ence sources, such as microwave ovens and other appliances, simply 
emit raw noise with no encoding whatsoever.  In addition, as the dis-
cussion of propagation shows, interference may also depend on inan-
imate objects and terrain.  Thus, some contributing factors to 
interference are not sources of emissions at all.  With respect to the 
Internet, the source address in the IP header is insecure and can be 
forged to misrepresent the source, as often occurs with spam.  A tech-
nology known as Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) allows parties to 
authenticate the source of every packet.  Moreover, the National Sci-
ence Foundation is supporting research into new possible network ar-
chitectures, all of which include a higher degree of identity 
verification.68  As of today, however, IPsec has not been widely de-
ployed, and the new, clean-slate proposals are still in their conceptual 
stages.69  Until those problems are addressed, identifying sources of in-
terference will remain a difficult task. 
C.  The Intractability of Attributing Harm 
Even if it were possible to identify all sources of interference, a 
property regime must also provide some basis for apportioning liability 
among those sources.  As Richard Epstein has noted, however, “[t]he 
question of the allocation between joint forces is a bit like the question 
of joint costs in economics:  there is simply no unique allocation of the 
 
67 Charles Jackson et al., Spread Spectrum Is Good—But It Does Not Obsolete NBC v. 
U.S.!, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 245, 253-59 (2006). 
68 See Press Release, Nat’l Sci. Found., NSF Announces Future Internet Architecture 
Awards (Aug. 27, 2010), available at http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_ 
id=117611&org=OLPA (enabling “researchers at dozens of institutions across the coun-
try to pursue new ways to build a more trustworthy and robust Internet”). 
69 See, e.g., Brent Rowe & Michael Gallaher, Could IPv6 Improve Network Security?  
And, If So, at What Cost?, 2 I/S:  J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 231, 235 (2006). 
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costs of the animal which is used to produce valuable meat and valuable 
furs.”70  The common law has developed two approaches for allocating 
liability:  the “substantial factor” test and enterprise liability.  Neither 
seems well suited to solving the problems of modern property. 
1.  The “Substantial Factor” Test 
The Second Restatement of Torts requires that a defendant’s con-
duct be “a substantial factor in bringing about the harm” before it can 
be considered a cause of that harm.71  If courts can determine the ex-
tent to which multiple causes contributed to a single harm, they can 
apportion harm on that basis.72  The Second Restatement’s chapter on 
nuisance similarly provides that a person is liable only when he “partic-
ipates to a substantial extent” in carrying on the activity allegedly creat-
ing the nuisance.73  The effect is to establish a minimum threshold of 
culpability before attributing liability. 
While the test has the virtue of screening out minor causal factors, 
the test allocates liability “on an all-or-nothing basis”:74  those whose 
actions fall above a certain causal threshold bear responsibility for the 
entire harm, notwithstanding the presence of other causal agents, 
while those whose actions fall below a certain causal threshold escape 
liability altogether.75  This regime seems a poor fit for modern forms of 
property.  The cumulative nature of interference means that even small 
actions have a direct adverse effect.  The localized nature of interfer-
ence complicates the inquiry still further, since it is not the magnitude 
of the interference simpliciter that matters, but rather its location in 
relation to other uses. 
 
70 Richard A. Epstein, Causation—In Context:  An Afterword, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
653, 671 (1987). 
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431(a) (1965). 
72 See id. § 433 (listing “considerations . . . important in determining whether the 
actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another”). 
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 834 (1979); see also id. § 834 cmt. d (“When 
a person is only one of several persons participating in carrying on an activity, his  
participation must be substantial before he can be held liable for the harm resulting 
from it.”). 
74 Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law:  Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 
VA. L. REV. 713, 715 (1982). 
75 See id. at 715-16 (noting that this “limitation is a fairly crude one,” but that loss-
apportionment schemes in many jurisdictions now mitigate the severity of the law by 
“requiring contribution among joint tortfeasors and comparative appointment between 
negligent plaintiffs and defendants”). 
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2.  Enterprise Liability 
The other primary approach developed by the common law is en-
terprise, or market share, liability, in which liability is allocated in pro-
portion to market share.  The doctrine was initially developed to cope 
with the challenge of allocating liability for the harm done by “fungi-
ble goods . . . which cannot be traced to any specific producer.”76  
More recently, some courts have begun to explore whether market 
share liability should also be extended to nuisance.77 
Even supporters of the doctrine concede that it is widely regarded 
as a failure,78 and the doctrine has been largely ignored in the Third 
Restatement of Torts.79  Whatever its overall merits, enterprise liability 
seems ill-suited to the modern system of property.  George Priest has 
observed that enterprise liability implicitly presumes that all products 
comprising the market contributed equally to the harm.80  To the ex-
tent that contributions to harm are differential (as is generally the case 
when the effect of interference is localized), enterprise liability under-
deters those market participants who are the most responsible.81   
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CHOICE OF PROPERTY FORM 
In addition to suggesting a more technological approach to prop-
erty, the unique characteristics of these new forms of property also 
have implications for the choice among the various property forms.  
 
76 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980); see also id. at 937 (“[W]e 
hold it to be reasonable . . . to measure the likelihood that any of the defendants sup-
plied the [pregnancy drug] which allegedly injured plaintiff by the percentage which 
the [drug] . . . bears to the entire production of the drug sold by all . . . .”). 
77 See George L. Priest, Market Share Liability in Personal Injury and Public Nuisance Lit-
igation:  An Economic Analysis, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 109, 121-24 (2010) (“[T]wo courts 
recently have ruled that sufficient evidence exists to try a case against lead pigment 
manufacturers as a public nuisance.”). 
78 See generally Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Enterprise Liability Reexamined, 75 
OR. L. REV. 467 (1996) (“Today it is widely believed that the enterprise liability revolu-
tion has been a failure.”).   
79 See Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Lia-
bility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1288 (2001) (“It is . . . surprising and disturbing that the 
theory of enterprise liability does not make any appearance at all in the [Third  
Restatement].”). 
80  Priest, supra note 77, at 111. 
81 See id. at 113 (“[E]ven if perfectly allocated, [market share liability] is unlikely to 
affect incentives for the manufacture of safer products, as the DES and lead paint  
cases . . . illustrate.”). 
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These unique qualities shed new light on the ongoing debate between 
property and the commons and also suggest the possibility of a role for 
third-party intermediaries. 
A.  Well-Defined Property Rights 
One of the central preconditions for the market-based system of 
property rights that Coase envisioned was for “the legal system . . . to 
establish that clear delimitation of rights on the basis of which the 
transfer and recombination of rights can take place through the mar-
ket.”82  He suggested that radio frequency rights could be defined by 
analogy to other emergent types of property rights, such as water rights, 
trademarks, noise nuisances, and rights to ice from public ponds.83   
Coase’s proposal spawned a vibrant literature during the 1960s 
and 1970s that attempted to define property rights in spectrum.  The 
most generative proposal defined spectrum rights in terms of three 
attributes:  the time during which transmission occurs; the area over 
which the transmission occurs, defined largely in terms of location and 
power; and the spectrum over which transmission occurs, defined  
in terms of frequencies.84  The hope was that this definition would 
eliminate the need for the government to designate specific uses.85  
License holders would remain free to allocate their spectrum to any 
purpose so long as their activities did not exceed these parameters at 
 
82 Coase, supra note 1, at 25. 
83 Id. at 30-31. 
84 See William K. Jones, Use and Regulation of the Radio Spectrum:  Report on a Confer-
ence, 1968 WASH. U. L.Q. 71, 72 (describing how separating signals by time, space, and 
frequency could help to “eliminate or minimize electronic interference”); Harvey J. 
Levin, The Radio Spectrum Resource, 11 J.L. & ECON. 433, 433, 438-39 (1968) (noting that 
while technology could improve the spectrum, “a natural resource” is “clearly subject 
to . . . degradation through pollution and congestion,” and must therefore be adminis-
tratively regulated across time, space, and frequency dimensions); William H. Meckling, 
Management of the Frequency Spectrum, 1968 WASH. U. L.Q. 26, 26, 28-29 (arguing that the 
spectrum poses problems no different than those relating to “land, labor, and capital,” 
and proposing that “government agencies responsible for spectrum utilization deci-
sions . . . make . . . decisions on the basis of the market value of frequencies”); Minasian, 
supra note 44, at 227-35 (describing how licensing, by assigning temporal and spatial 
broadcasting rights to certain individuals while simultaneously excluding others from 
access, allows the maintenance of adequate signal quality). 
85 See, e.g., De Vany et al., supra note 23, at 1518 (“The exclusive assignment of 
rights for all three [time, area, and spectrum] dimensions to specific individuals or 
firms eliminates potential common-resource problems.”). 
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the boundary of their service areas.86  This so-called TAS (time, area, 
spectrum) proposal served as the basis for many subsequent pro-
posals.87  
Whatever the merits of these designs during the simpler times of 
the 1960s, when broadcasting represented the sole mass-market use of 
spectrum, they seem singularly out of place in a world dominated by a 
much wider range of devices employing different technologies and 
operating at mobile locations at varying degrees of power.88  In this 
environment, the more variable and discontinuous nature of sources 
of interference suggests that this approach is likely too simplistic. 
The proposal advanced by the FCC’s Spectrum Policy Task Force is 
illustrative.  Although it took the TAS framework described above as its 
starting point, it also developed a metric known as the “interference 
temperature” as a measurement of noise levels that spectrum users 
must accept from other sources.89  The Task Force’s Report noted that 
this variable is the hardest to capture “[b]ecause all of the[] sources 
may not be known or anticipated.”90  The problems were exacerbated 
 
86 See id. at 1512-18 (discussing the temporal and spatial dimensions of property 
rights in the spectrum and noting that, while “rights are transferable and divisible,” 
they must respect their temporal, spatial, and frequency-based limitations). 
87 See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, “Propertyzing” the Electromagnetic Spectrum:  Why It’s Im-
portant, and How to Begin, 9 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 19, 29-30 (2000) (noting a number of 
subsequent approaches based on the TAS framework); Evan Kwerel & John Williams, A 
Proposal for a Rapid Transition to Market Allocation of Spectrum, at iv-v, 16-24 (Fed. 
Commc’ns Comm’n OPP Working Paper Series, Paper No. 38, 2002), available at 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/conferences/combin2003/papers/masterevanjohn 
.pdf (advancing three proposals to reduce current “shortages and waste” in the spec-
trum); see also Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia:  Building the Commons of the Digi-
tally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 393-94 (1998) (proposing “an 
appropriate regulatory space for unlicensed wireless operations”); Gerald R. Faulhaber, 
The Question of Spectrum:  Technology, Management, and Regime Change, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. 
& HIGH TECH. L. 123, 160 (2005) (“I propose that license restrictions . . . have the force 
of trespass law . . . [so that if] a licensee violate[s] one of its restrictions, its neighbors 
could obtain injunctive relief without a showing of damages.”); Ellen P. Goodman, 
Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269, 315-26 (2004) (describ-
ing, in particular, two alternatives designed “to correct the failings of administrative 
control of spectrum”); Meckling, supra note 84, at 28 (stating that the literature con-
tains two main proposals—a goal of minimizing spectrum interference, and a goal of 
using spectrum efficiently). 
88 See Werbach, supra note 40, at 921 (noting that such doctrinal proposals were  
designed for cases “light years away from the situation of many roving ad hoc transmit-
ters using some combination of spread-spectrum, directional antennas, meshed net-
working, and software-designed radio”). 
89 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 15, at 27 (“The interference temperature 
measures the RF power available at the receiving antenna per unit bandwidth.”). 
90 Id. at 18. 
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by the constant emergence of new devices and technologies, the  
increasingly intensive use of the spectrum, the growing prevalence of 
mobile devices, the cumulative nature of interference, and the pres-
ence of out-of-band emissions.91   
The analytical framework laid out here helps explain the failure of 
the interference temperature metric by underscoring the extent to 
which its approach was underspecified.  A license holder who recognizes 
that it is receiving improper interference has no way to determine the 
sources of that interference.  Absent such a basis, there is no way to 
determine against whom the rights should be enforced.  As noted above, 
the FCC subsequently abandoned the concept and conspicuously omit-
ted any statement of creating primary markets for spectrum from the 
National Broadband Plan.92  Despite the admonitions of a distinguished 
and politically diverse group of economists,93 the FCC appears to have 
abandoned efforts to establish true property rights in spectrum. 
In addition, the interdependencies that characterize new technol-
ogies help explain why property-rights regimes in spectrum have failed 
to emerge.  As Henry Smith has noted, the exclusion-based strategies 
associated with property rights necessarily require greater reliance on 
rough proxies that bundle mutual uses together.94  The appropriate 
bundle of proxies does not present itself preformed when the resource 
being propertized is intangible.95  Moreover, the complex interde-
pendencies associated with new technologies caution against exclusion 
regimes by suggesting that the mutuality of uses will tend to run across 
different parcels rather than within them. 
 
91 See id. at 25-26 (discussing the new challenges for interference management that 
have arisen recently as a result of new technology and “the increasingly intensive use of 
the radio spectrum”). 
92 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
93 See Comments of 37 Concerned Economists, supra note 14, at 5-6 (“To promote 
efficient secondary markets, the Commission must address its primary license rights.”). 
94 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance:  Two Strategies for Delineating Prop-
erty Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S469 (2002) (“Because attributes and uses are costly 
to measure, rights to them are delineated and defended by means of proxies, and it is 
the use of rougher proxies that leads to more activities being bunched together in a 
more exclusion-like right.”). 
95 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimen-
sions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1047 (2008) (“Due to their intangible nature, intellectual 
assets do not have clear boundaries.  Indeed, defining the boundaries of intellectual 
assets is one of the most difficult challenges lawmakers must confront.”). 
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B.  Spectrum Commons 
Many scholars have advocated for a spectrum commons based on 
three different rationales.  First, they invoke the work of scholars, such 
as Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom, to show that commons can be gov-
erned even in the absence of property rights.96  Second, they cite the 
theory of the anticommons popularized by Michael Heller to show 
how property rights can cause resources to be systematically un-
derused.97  Third, they argue that technology has eliminated scarcity to 
the point where spectrum need no longer be allocated.  
1.  Ostrom and Governing the Commons 
One central argument advanced by proponents of the commons is 
that people who use a resource need not resort to legal means to en-
sure that the resource is used efficiently.  Indeed, the most developed 
body of scholarship exploring how societies can regulate behavior 
without resort to law is the body of research into social norms.98  
Commentators widely recognize that the universe of Internet users can 
no longer be characterized as the type of “close-knit community” 
needed for social norms to arise.99  Instead, these commentators base 
their faith on the work of scholars, such as Elinor Ostrom, exploring 
 
96 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:  THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
97 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:  Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 668, 673-79 (1998) (defining anticommons 
property as “a property regime in which multiple owners hold effective rights of exclu-
sion in a scarce resource” (emphasis omitted)). 
98 For the classic work on this body of scholarship, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,  
ORDER WITHOUT LAW:   HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
99 See, e.g., Steven A. Hetcher, Norm Proselytizers Create a Privacy Entitlement in Cyber-
space, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 887-88 (2001) (noting that the Internet has changed 
drastically since it was initially developed in the 1960s, when its primary user base was a 
small, close-knit community of academics able to regulate itself through norms); Mark 
Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1257, 1267-70 
(1998) (“No one would call the Internet a static community.  Indeed, what Internet 
norms have managed to develop have regularly been blown apart by entry.”); Margaret 
Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering:  Rediscovering Legal Realism in 
Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1295, 1308 (1998) (“Achievement of stability in a self-
regulated commons is often thought to be dependent upon whether the cooperators 
are a close-knit social group.  Earlier users of the Internet may have belonged to a 
close-knit social group but this is not true of Internet users today.”).  
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how effective governance regimes can arise even in large, heterogene-
ous communities. 100   
Ostrom’s landmark book, Governing the Commons, begins as a de-
scriptive endeavor that explores the qualities of a number of such sys-
tems and then proceeds to identify similarities that those systems 
share.101  A number of these similarities have important implications 
for the debate over the commons.  First, the property right must have 
clearly defined boundaries, a feature that Ostrom regards as “the sin-
gle defining characteristic of ‘common property’ institutions.”102  In 
addition, such a commons must have appropriation rules that are well-
tailored to the specific situations of different individuals.103  In addi-
tion, such a regime must have effective monitoring to allocate access 
to the shared resource.104 
As an initial matter, Ostrom presumes the existence of well-
defined property rights upon which a governance regime can be 
erected.  As such, it is not properly regarded as an alternative to prop-
erty rights.  Instead, it is more properly regarded as what has been called 
“common property” or “limited commons,” which Carol Rose has aptly 
described as “property on the outside, commons on the inside.”105  
 
100 See Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 25, 49 (2002) (noting that there has been a “burgeoning literature” suggesting 
that individually owned property might not always be the most efficient way of organiz-
ing the use of a resource); Stuart Buck, Replacing Spectrum Auctions with a Spectrum Com-
mons, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, ¶¶ 42-77, http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/ 
02_STLR_2 (drawing on Elinor Ostrom’s work to develop a “commons-based regulato-
ry scheme for the spectrum”); Goodman, supra note 87, at 284 (analogizing licensees’ 
rights to the spectrum to “cooperative forms of land use by small, close-knit groups”); 
Werbach, supra note 40, at 937 (noting that “[s]cholars such as Elinor Ostrom have 
examined conditions under which commons are self-regulating” and that scholars have 
argued that spectrum can be thought of as a common pool resource). 
101 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:  THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
102 Id. at 91. 
103 See id. at 92 (explaining the need for a “[c]ongruence between appropriation 
and provision rules and local conditions”). 
104 See id. at 94-100 (describing the role and necessity of effective monitoring and 
sanctions). 
105 Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property:  Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission 
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 144 (1998); see also Thráinn Eggertsson, 
Open Access versus Common Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS:  COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND 
LAW 73, 74-76 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003); Charlotte Hess & 
Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities:  Information as a Common Pool Resource, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 121-23 (2003) (explaining the difference between open-
access regimes “where no one has the legal right to exclude anyone from using a re-
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Within the commons, individuals do not have the type of open access 
that commons advocates envision.  Usage is not permissionless and is 
instead subject to strict internal regulation.106  In addition, the internal 
governance rules do not envision equal access to the resource.  In-
stead, they are supposed to account for differences in circumstances 
and to allow for differential usage.107  Lastly, as Hanoch Dagan and Mi-
chael Heller have noted, Ostrom’s mechanism for self-governance pre-
sumes that exit is impossible,108 whereas for participants in markets for 
spectrum and the Internet, exit is always possible.  
Other scholars have explored certain structural preconditions that 
must exist for such commons-based governance to exist.  For example, 
Gary Libecap argues that the community must be sufficiently stable so 
that entry does not destabilize the management regime.109  Moreover, 
the participants should be homogeneous in terms of capabilities, in-
formation, past production, costs, and size, as variability makes it more 
difficult to find that the benefits of collective action would exceed the 
benefits of acting unilaterally.110  Again, none of these conditions ap-
pear to match the type of permissionless, unlimited access envisioned 
by commons advocates for spectrum or the Internet.  Nor is the under-
lying population sufficiently stable or homogeneous to permit reliance 
on nonlegal governance mechanisms. 
2.  Heller and The Tragedy of the Anticommons 
As noted above, commons advocates also frequently invoke the 
theory of the anticommons most strongly associated with the work of 
Michael Heller.111  According to Heller, anticommons arise when “mul-
 
source” and common property regimes “where members of a clearly defined group 
have a bundle of legal rights including the right to exclude nonmembers from using 
that resource”). 
106 See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 101, at 126 (discussing the role of “watermasters” in 
allocating shared resources). 
107 See id. at 58-91 (examining different common property regimes and their differ-
ences which resulted from varying circumstances). 
108 See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 
565-66 (2001) (noting that a price of Ostrom’s mechanism for self-governance is that it 
“require[s] locking people together in static communities”). 
109 Gary D. Libecap, The Conditions for Successful Collective Action, in LOCAL COMMONS 
AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE:  HETEROGENEITY AND COOPERATION IN TWO DOMAINS 
161, 163 (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995). 
110 Id. at 163, 165, 187-88. 
111 See Benkler, supra note 100, at 30, 62-63 (noting that a pure spectrum property 
rights approach results in the “‘anticommons’ problem”); Buck, supra note 96, ¶¶ 89-
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tiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from a 
scarce resource.”112  When multiple owners are given the right to ex-
clude others, multiple parties must unanimously agree before any use 
can be made.  The difficulties in coordinating multiple interests mean 
that “no one has an effective privilege of use.”113  Heller’s central con-
cern is that the difficulty in getting these multiple parties to agree 
would lead to chronic underuse.114   
This invocation of the anticommons is imprecise in important 
ways.  The central concern that motivates commons advocates is the 
difficulty of convincing individual rightsholders—each possessing sole, 
exclusive rights—to aggregate their spectrum into a larger block.  The 
problem is thus not the classic anticommons situation of one piece of 
property with too many owners, but rather the more traditional  
numerosity problem of too many small pieces of property, each with a 
single owner.  
The difference may seem technical, but it is important.  When the 
problem is too many small parcels with single owners, the incentive to 
hold out results in behavior that resembles the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  
As Lee Anne Fennell has noted, tragedies of the anticommons tend to 
fall within another analytical structure known as the Chicken Game.115 
 
93 (discussing several situations in which large companies in the wireless industry bar-
gain with each other to solve problems and positing that these arrangements came 
about because the companies are interdependent); Goodman, supra note 87, at 366 
(“The obligation to negotiate leases with the tens or hundreds of rights holders in or-
der to transmit their low-power signals would quickly subject wideband operators to a 
‘tragedy of the anticommons’ as they encounter holdouts and excessive transaction 
costs.”); Werbach, supra note 40, at 965 (arguing that it would be a practical impossibility 
for devicemakers to negotiate to pay spectrum owners for an easement, especially for 
technologies such as ultra wideband, and noting that “[s]cholars have labeled this sce-
nario the anticommons”).  See generally Kevin Werbach, The Wasteland:  Anticommons, 
White Spaces, and the Fallacy of Spectrum, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 213 (2011) (applying Michael 
Heller’s anticommons theory to spectrum policy). 
112 Id. at 624. 
113 Id. 
114 See id. at 674 (“[E]ven if the number of parties and transaction costs are low, [a] 
resource still may not be efficiently used because of bargaining failures generated by 
holdouts . . . .”). 
115 See Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 941-48 
(2004) (“The Chicken Game has been explicitly invoked to describe land assembly 
problems which involve an anticommons-like structure; the link between the Chicken 
Game and the anticommons is also implicit in the focus on holdouts in the anticom-
mons literature.”). 
For the seminal articulation of the Chicken Game, see Anatol Rapoport & Albert 
M. Chammah, The Game of Chicken, AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST, Nov. 1966, at 10.  The Chicken 
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Figure 6:  Prisoner’s Dilemma vs. the Chicken Game 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
             Player 2 
  Cooperate Defect
Player 1 
Cooperate 3, 3 1, 4 
Defect 4, 1 2, 2 
 
 
  
Chicken Game 
  
           Player 2 
  Cooperate Defect
Player 1 
Cooperate 3, 3 2, 4 
Defect 4, 2 1, 1 
 
 
These two games have fundamentally different characteristics.  
The perverse aspect of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that if both prisoners 
act rationally, they will both defect despite the fact that both would be 
better off if they mutually cooperated.  Much of the literature focuses 
on how devices such as iteration can induce cooperation.116  In addition, 
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas that take place within a spatial structure, 
in which players compete with their immediate neighbors instead of 
with the entire universe of other players, tend to exhibit greater coop-
eration, as cooperators survive by forming large compact clusters that 
minimize their exposure and potential exploitation by defectors.117 
 
Game is also called the Snowdrift Game or the Hawk-Dove Game.  See ROBERT SUGDEN, 
THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE 58-62, 128-32 (1986). 
116 For the classic work on this phenomenon, see ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION 
OF COOPERATION (rev. ed. 2006).  For a recent survey, see Michael Doebeli & Christoph 
Hauert, Models of Cooperation Based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game, 8 
ECOLOGY LETTERS 748 (2005). 
117 See, e.g., Martin A. Nowak & Robert M. May, Evolutionary Games and Spatial Chaos, 
359 NATURE 826 (1992).  For a recent survey, see Doebeli & Hauert, supra note 116, at 
750-57. 
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In the Chicken Game, there is no strategy that is always rational for 
either player.  Player 1’s optimal strategy differs based on what she as-
sumes about Player 2’s strategy and vice versa.  Thus, the Chicken 
Game is said to have no dominant strategy.  The one who wins is the 
one who convinces the other side that she is sufficiently irrational to 
be willing to die rather than turn aside.118  As such, it inherently en-
courages and rewards commitments not to cooperate or, if that is im-
possible, bluffing.  Moreover, the number of cooperators that exists in 
equilibrium depends on the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation.119 
The Chicken Game has qualities that are quite different from the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma.  The structure of the game does not trap parties 
into a vicious circle in which it is never rational for them to cooper-
ate.120  In short, the spirit of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is the opportunity 
for mutual cooperation frustrated by the lack of trust.  By contrast, the 
spirit of the Chicken Game is inherently adversarial; there is no missed 
opportunity for cooperation that would have left both parties better 
off.121  Moreover, rationality in the Chicken Game “depends on a  
player’s expectations about the other’s behavior, not primarily on the 
game’s payoff structure.”122  As is the case in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
the Chicken Game leads to less cooperation than is socially optimal, 
since the average payoff in equilibrium is less than the average payoff 
of a population comprised entirely of cooperators.123 
The inherently adversarial nature of the Chicken Game led some 
scholars to suggest that cooperation would be harder to establish in 
 
118 See WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA 200-01 (1992) (noting that “an 
irrational player has the upper hand in chicken,” including when the player is suicidal 
or acts randomly); Peter Kollock, Social Dilemmas:  The Anatomy of Cooperation, 24 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 183, 187 (1998) (explaining that one has an advantage in the Chicken Game 
if one can “convince the other person that [h]is strategy is crazy, irrational, suicidal, or 
otherwise incapable or unwilling to change course”). 
119 See Christoph Hauert & Michael Doebeli, Spatial Structure Often Inhibits the Evolu-
tion of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game, 428 NATURE 643, 644 (2004) (asserting that in 
the snowdrift game, the “average population payoff at . . . equilibrium is smaller than 
the average payoff in a population of only cooperators”). 
120 See Glenn H. Snyder, “Prisoner’s Dilemma” and “Chicken” Models in International  
Politics, 15 INT’L STUD. Q. 66, 83 (1971) (“In chicken, there is no ‘tragedy’ or ‘vicious 
circle.’”). 
121 Id. at 84. 
122 Id. at 85. 
123 See Hauert & Doebeli, supra note 119, at 644. 
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the Chicken Game than in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.124  Later work re-
vealed a more complex set of dynamics.  A number of studies conclude 
that iterated Chicken Games exhibit higher levels of cooperation than 
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas.125  Chicken Games exhibit lower levels of 
cooperation than Prisoner’s Dilemmas when iterated in a spatial frame-
work.126  Whatever the resolution, it is clear these games have different 
structures and different intuitions.  Those who confuse the problems 
assembling spectrum with the tragedy of the anticommons misunder-
stand the key differences in the form of stalemate associated with each. 
Stated more generally, when parties co-own the same property and 
cannot dispose of it or improve it without the unanimous consent of 
the other owners, they are locked in with one another, with little value 
derived from partial agreement.  The situation is quite different when 
the problem is acquiring smaller pieces of property from single owners 
and assembling them into a larger block.  There may be some value to 
partial assembly, so that the failure to achieve unanimity does not 
eliminate all of the value of partial agreement.  Moreover, when una-
nimity is not required, bluffing is more likely to be self-defeating.127  In 
fact, the risk that a party may be excluded from a deal may give that 
party a stronger inducement to sell.128  Moreover, it is possible that the 
party attempting to assemble a large block may be able to substitute a 
different adjacent parcel.  Such substitutions are impossible when 
 
124 See Snyder, supra note 120, at 85 (arguing that rationality in the Chicken Game 
is “equivocal”). 
125 See Bengt Carlsson & K. Ingemar Jönsson, Differences Between the Iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma and the Chicken Game Under Noisy Conditions, 2002 PROC. ACM SYMP. ON APPLIED 
COMPUTING 42, 46 (“With increased noise . . . forgiving strategies become more and 
more successful in [an iterated Chicken Game] while repeating and revenging strate-
gies are more successful in [an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma].”); Garrison W. Green-
wood & Shubham Chopra, A Numerical Analysis of the Evolutionary Iterated Snowdrift Game, 
2011 PROC. IEEE CONGRESS ON EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTING 2010, 2015-16 (using an 
iterated Snowdrift Game to demonstrate how cooperation can be encouraged in social 
dilemma situations like the Chicken Game); Rolf Kümmerli et al., Human Cooperation in 
Social Dilemmas:  Comparing the Snowdrift Game with the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 274 PROC. ROYAL 
SOC’Y B 2965, 2965 (2007) (demonstrating higher levels of cooperation in iterated 
Chicken Games because the cooperation “yields a benefit . . . to both players”). 
126 See Hauert & Doebeli, supra note 119, at 644 (noting the “contrary effects of spa-
tial structure in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and in the snowdrift game” and attributing the 
difference to the type of clusters which arise in each case through microscopic processes). 
127 Fennell, supra note 115, at 971-72. 
128 Id. at 974. 
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agreement must be obtained from multiple owners of the same piece of 
property.   
Equally important, many legal scholars regard the anticommons as 
an argument against propertization and in favor of a commons.  Far 
from representing a blanket condemnation of property rights, the  
archetypical solution to the anticommons is not common property, but 
rather the unification of the rights in a single owner.129  In later work 
with Hanoch Dagan, Heller offers alternative solutions to policing 
overuse of the commons that rely more on governance mechanisms.130  
But even when this is the case, the imperfections in these mechanisms 
dictate that they be backstopped by high-powered, well-defined back-
ground rules that would internalize each common user’s costs, such as 
making all violators liable for the fair market value of their uses.131   
It comes as no surprise, then, that Heller is quite critical of spec-
trum commons as a solution.132  The real basis for unlicensed spectrum 
success stories such as WiFi may lie instead in their ability to piggyback 
on other property regimes.  Despite the fact that WiFi signals often spill 
across property lines, the metes and bounds of real property provide a 
rough approximation of the footprint of WiFi signals.  Thus, although 
the unlicensed nature of WiFi may limit the ability to curb overuse  
 
129 See Heller, supra note 111, at 640 (“Moving a storefront from anticommons to 
private property ownership requires unifying fragmented property rights into a usable 
bundle.  In other words, creating private property requires moving from too many own-
ers, each exercising a right of exclusion, to a sole decisionmaker, controlling a bundle 
of rights.”); id. at 678 (“In the commons case, property theorists have proposed that 
societies may overcome tragedy by evolving toward private property relations. . . . The 
theoretical arguments on the commons carry over, by analogy, to the problem of over-
coming an anticommons.  In the anticommons case, moving to a private property  
regime may better align each owner’s interest with efficient use, because a private property 
owner faces the full cost of underconsumption.”). 
130 See Dagan & Heller, supra note 108, at 590 (arguing for a system of democratic 
self-governance based on a majority rule rather than a unanimity rule because “by re-
quiring complete agreement on management issues and by emboldening holdouts, 
unanimity rules may lead to anticommons tragedy, that is, mutual vetoes that waste a 
resource through underuse”).   
131 See id. at 584 (arguing for ex ante rules to guarantee that overexploitation is 
minimized). 
132 See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY:  HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP 
WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 94 (2008) (“[F]irst we must 
unify rights in spectrum into coherent, well-defined ownership bundles.  Otherwise, we 
are stuck where we started, with spectrum wasted in a tragedy of the anticommons.”). 
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directly, the exclusion rights provided by real property may represent a 
useful proxy by which spectrum exclusion may be approximated.133 
3.  The End of Scarcity versus Shannon’s Law 
Finally, commons scholars argue that improvements in the effi-
ciency of spectrum usage have reduced scarcity to the point where 
property rights are no longer needed.134  One such technique involves 
smart radios (also called agile radios or software defined radios) that 
permit transmitters to shift dynamically to open frequencies.  The other 
technique is spread spectrum, in which a signal is broadcast at low 
power across a broader range of frequencies than are usually used.  
Because these emanations are below the current noise floor, commons 
advocates argue that they can exist without interfering with other  
licensed uses.  Although the end of scarcity represents a very strong 
assumption, it is not a straw man.  It is the logical lynchpin required 
for this argument in favor of a spectrum commons to hold. 
Shannon’s Law underscores the notion that no amount of artful 
management can eliminate scarcity.  Smart radios simply use spectrum 
more efficiently; they do not increase its carrying capacity.  With re-
spect to spread spectrum, the addition of another signal below the 
 
133 Cf. Yoo, supra note 47, at 1873-74 (discussing how Coaseian proxies can allow 
metering of nonexcludable goods). 
134 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:  THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 47, 241-44 (2001) (arguing that much of the spectrum should be 
left in the commons unless it becomes clear that it needs to be allocated); Benkler, 
supra note 87, at 324 (“The technological shift derives from various techniques—such 
as spread spectrum and code division multiple access, time division multiple access, 
frequency hopping, and packet switching—for allowing multiple users to communicate 
at the same time using the same frequency range. . . . What is crucial to understand 
about these technologies is that they challenge the underlying assumption of both  
licensing and privatization:  that the only way to assure high quality wireless communi-
cations is to assign one person the right to transmit in a given frequency band.” (foot-
note omitted)); Buck, supra note 96, ¶¶ 20-26 (explaining that, even though the 
commons has been described as “scarce” for many years—and even though its scarcity 
was used to justify government allocation—cutting-edge technologies promise to elimi-
nate that scarcity by making it possible for multiple users to share the same spread of 
frequencies without interference); Werbach, supra note 40, at 897-98, 911 (describing 
new technologies that transform the spectrum into a commons by eliminating scarcity); 
see also Yochai Benkler & Lawrence Lessig, Net Gains:  Will Technology Make CBS Unconsti-
tutional?, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 14, 1998, at 12, 14 (advancing the argument that techno-
logical changes have made it so that the spectrum no longer has to be allocated and 
that these technological changes’ eliminating scarcity of the spectrum make FCC allo-
cation of the spectrum constitutionally suspect). 
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current noise level simply raises the noise floor.  Because throughput 
is a function of signal-to-noise ratio, the addition of these low-power 
signals inevitably reduces the capacity available to others.135  Although 
previous improvements may have made it appear that capacity im-
provements could go on indefinitely, engineers now observe that the 
bandwidth channels are beginning to approach the theoretical limits 
implied by Shannon’s Law.136 
C.  Bargaining as an Alternate Solution 
Redefining the scope of property rights is not the only way to ad-
dress the problems associated with interference.  The Coase Theorem 
showed how rights can be redistributed via contract instead of proper-
ty.137  But in this case, the crux of the problem stems not from direct 
externalities, but rather from the inability to observe the information 
needed to manage the resulting interdependencies.  This suggests an 
alternative approach that solves coordination problems by making the 
information needed to allow the reorganization of entitlements more 
visible and thus more contractible.  Indeed, this is precisely the ap-
proach taken with respect to the electric power grid by comapnies such 
as PJM Interconnection LLC, which gather widely scattered infor-
mation and suggest prices.138  Such smart markets have been proposed 
by Jeff MacKie-Mason and Hal Varian for the Internet139 and by Eli  
Noam for spectrum.140  This approach also resembles the proposed 
database for sharing information about unlicensed spectrum uses in 
 
135 See Jackson et al., supra note 67, at 259-62 (showing how spread spectrum uses 
are perceived by other users as noise that reduces the radio systems’ available band-
width). 
136 See Andrew D. Ellis et al., Approaching the Non-Linear Shannon Limit, 28 J. LIGHT-
WAVE TECH. 423, 424-27 (2010). 
137 See Coase, supra note 7. 
138 See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Broadband Internet Access, 
22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 53-54 (2008) (noting that PJM uses its electrical monitoring 
information to “establish both a day-ahead market and a real-time spot market”). 
139 See Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason & Hal R. Varian, Some Economics of the Internet, in 
NETWORKS, INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE NEW TASK FOR REGULATION 107, 126-31 (Wer-
ner Sichel & Donald L. Alexander eds., 1996). 
140 See Eli Noam, Spectrum Auctions:  Yesterday’s Heresy, Today’s Orthodoxy, Tomorrow’s 
Anachronism.  Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access, 41 J.L. & ECON. 765, 778-81 
(1998) (proposing an open-access model where assured price for access to a spectrum 
band could be determined by an automated clearinghouse of spectrum uses and  
assured access could be obtained from a futures market). 
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part of the bands reserved for television currently laying fallow (com-
monly known as “white spaces”).141  Centralizing such information can 
solve the multiparty bargaining problems that plague the Internet.142 
This alternative approach would fundamentally redefine the prop-
er role of property law.  Rather than adjusting the scope of rights to 
mediate relationships between property holders directly, property 
could instead focus on providing owners with the building blocks 
needed to permit them to reallocate those rights via contract.  That 
said, reallocating rights through decentralized decisionmaking pre-
sents a number of challenges.  As an initial matter, most of these pro-
posals envision that users will have to pay for access to the resource.  
As such, they are not particularly responsive to concerns about main-
taining access for low-value or novel uses.  In addition, the functioning 
of such coordination will be greatly complicated if individuals vary in 
the way they use spectrum.  This will pose particular problems for appli-
cations that require large blocks of spectrum.  As Thomas Hazlett ob-
serves, such a solution simply replaces one big auction with many little 
ones.143  Moreover, as the experience with the Internet reveals, any de-
viation between private and social optima creates incentives for users 
in decentralized systems to cheat.  This is why most proposals envision 
that there must be an enforcement mechanism.144  The information 
sharing and price coordination associated with market-making inevita-
 
141 Werbach, supra note 97, at 252-54 (delineating the benefits of white space devices 
in “facilitat[ing] efficient utilization of . . . spectrum”). 
142 See Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated 
Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 710-17 (2010) (discussing how third-party market 
makers can resolve bargaining dilemmas). 
143 See Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Flash Dance:  Eli Noam’s Proposal for “Open Access” 
to Radio Waves, 41 J.L. & ECON. 805, 814 (1998) (analogizing such a scheme to a gov-
ernment land monopoly that leased tiny plots for short periods). 
144 See Noam, supra note 140, at 781 (“Enforcement of the system is straightforward 
for those flows of information that are transferred across networks.  Without authoriza-
tion code, they could not flow.  For nonnetwork usage, the presence of transmissions 
without access codes would be closely watched by their competitors, and violators 
would be sued or reported.”); Werbach, supra note 97, at 252-53 (“The FCC certifies all 
wireless devices.  Therefore, its service rules for the white spaces can mandate that de-
vices incorporate the database functionality, and also that they comply with directives 
from the database.  The devices can even include a ‘remote kill switch’ to cease trans-
mitting entirely if nearby systems experience interference or the devices are operating 
outside their parameters.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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bly raises antitrust concerns.145  That said, such intermediaries may rep-
resent the best opportunity for allowing greater flexibility in uses.  The 
task would shift from trying to define the proper scope of property 
rights to providing verifiable information needed to support enforcea-
ble contracting. 
D.  The Persistence of Use Restrictions 
The difficulties that interdependencies create for implementing  
a full-fledged property regime help explain the inability to follow 
Coase’s call to abolish the current regime of use restrictions.  Ithiel de 
Sola Pool first made the case with respect to spectrum in his landmark 
book, Technologies of Freedom.  Although Pool saw the advantages of  
allowing rights holders to employ their spectrum for whatever use they 
saw fit, the lack of equipment standardization would impose high costs 
on third parties.146  It is to avoid these costs that the government zones 
different bands of the spectrum for different uses (much like zoning 
for real estate) and sets equipment standards within each band.147  In a 
similar vein, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith argue that governments 
standardize real property forms in order to minimize measurement 
costs borne by third parties.148  Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky 
also contend that the multiplicity of uses may make it difficult to de-
termine the optimal dimensions of certain property attributes.  Here, 
the law may compensate by placing restrictions on owners’ freedom to 
reconfigure the property for alternate uses.149  For example, the great-
er susceptibility of low-power uses to interference may justify placing 
some restrictions on other uses operating in the same band.  Another 
strategy is to concentrate ownership in a single fictional owner, there-
 
145 See Ray S. Bolze et al., Antitrust Law Regulation:  A New Focus for a Competitive Energy 
Industry, 21 ENERGY L.J. 79, 103-06 (2000) (reviewing the antitrust concerns raised by 
RTOs). 
146 See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 144-45 (1983) (arguing 
that a market-based approach to spectrum distribution would “reduc[e] the opportunity 
for standardization of . . . equipment”). 
147 Id. at 145 (analogizing spectrum distribution to property zoning because in both 
cases the government acts to decrease social costs on “neighbors”). 
148 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property:  The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE. L.J. 1, 46-47 (2000) (discussing how 
one nonstandard property user out of one hundred can raise costs for the entire group). 
149 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 95, at 1049-53 (discussing rules that either 
directly or indirectly restrict property owners’ ability to “reconfigure their assets”). 
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by preserving the reduction in transaction costs associated with a single 
owner while facilitating reallocation by the government should it be-
come necessary.150 
CONCLUSION 
The emergence of new technologies is providing fresh insights that 
challenge preexisting notions of property.  Most importantly, these in-
sights suggest adopting a more technological, interdependency-based 
vision that would reorient property in fundamentally different direc-
tions.  In addition, the greater complexity of identifying sources of in-
terference and allocating responsibility to multiple sources of joint 
causation may require new legal tools and new configurations of prop-
erty.  This complexity underscores the potential of intermediaries to 
help solve many of these problems.  This reconfigured view of property 
also sheds new light on why true property rights in spectrum have been 
so slow to emerge.  In so doing, it points toward a new agenda for the 
necessary elements in a properly articulated property regime. 
 
150 See id. at 1044-46 (“[F]ictional owner strategy . . . enhanc[es] social utility de-
rived from asset management” and “minimizes the dissipation of utility caused by split-
ting assets among too many owners.”). 
